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A. Balasopoulos on Vincent Geoghegan’s
Utopianism and Marxism.
1 Vincent Geoghegan, Utopianism and Marxism. Oxford et al: Peter Lang, 2008. pp. 189. ISBN:
3039101374
2 In his contribution to Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of Truth,  Alain Badiou forcefully
argues that the century, “between 1917 and the end of the 1970s, is not at all a century of
ideologies,  or  the  imaginary  or  of  utopias,  as  the  liberals  would  have  it  today.  Its
subjective determination is Leninist. It is the passion of the real, of what is immediately
practicable, here and now.” 1 These words, issued forth in 2007 (and reappearing in the
same year’s The Century), sit rather uneasily with the kind of story Vincent Geoghegan’s
book tells about the place of Utopia in the evolution of Marxism during the last two
centuries,  including  its  place  in  Lenin’s  own  thought.  The  latter’s  famous  1902
intervention, “What is to Be Done” was, after all, entitled in an act of tribute to Nikolai
Chernyshevsky’s homonymous 1863 novel, described as “primarily a piece of socialist and
feminist utopianism”; and the conclusion of Lenin’s own reflections at the beginning of
the century involves a defense of the “positive assessment of dreaming against revisionist
and economistic  ‘realism’” (74).  If  “utopia” obtains a  negative significance for  Lenin,
Geoghegan adds, it is only in the sense of “totally arbitrary and abstract speculation,” one
that is not to be confused with a “denunciation of future speculation per se” (77).
3  The tension between these two positions is largely an effect of their respective moments
of enunciation: Geoghegan’s book was originally published in 1987, a time when “the
domestic  political  context  [in  Britain]  was  the  increasingly  confident  neo-liberal
conservatism of Margaret Thatcher, in power since 1979” (7). Badiou’s own look at the
past, by contrast, comes at the time of the death throes of this same neoliberal hegemony,
now compromised by global war, the drastic curtailment of civil liberties and an ever-
intensifying (and still unfolding) economic crisis that has been especially vehement at the
“advanced centers” of the capitalist world system. But this also means that Geoghegan’s
and Badiou’s contrasting interpretations are themselves parts of a still active, evolving
and  unfinished  tradition—that  of  Marxism—and  its  ongoing  negotiations  with  the
questions of Utopia and social  reality,  the imperatives of system-building and radical
transformation, the experiences of success and defeat, the organizational alternatives of
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centrism and pluralism—the set of problems, in fact, which Geoghegan’s brief but concise
treatise tackles.
4  The book comprises nine chapters, effectively distributed over four discrete historical
moments: first, that of the so-called Utopian Socialism of Saint-Simon, Owen and Fourier
and its deeply ambivalent reception in the work of Marx and Engels (chapters 1 and 2);
second, that of Social Democracy and Bolshevism as well as of a third path for which the
buried memories  of  an emancipated past  functioned as  means  of  negotiating a  path
beyond  the  rationalist/pragmatist  priorities  of  both  reformism  and  revolutionary
vanguardism  (chapters  3  and  4);  third,  the  political  triumph  of  the  “authoritarian
utopianism” of  Stalinism in the Soviet  Union and the challenge against  its  reductive
implications in Ernst Bloch’s magisterial  The Principle  of  Hope (chapters 5 and 6);  and
finally, the discrete but also largely related postwar attempts of Herbert Marcuse, Rudolf
Bahro,  and  André  Gorz  to  move  past  the  impasses  of  social  democracy  and  the
dictatorship of the proletariat in order to reclaim the vital significance of the utopian
impulse for a Marxist politics capable of doing justice to the increasingly more complex
demands of modernity (chapters 7, 8 and 9).
5  Though Geoghegan’s overall mode of approach seems to privilege contextual analysis
over theoretical groundwork, it is possible to discern two guiding assumptions informing
his work. These are: first, that utopianism constitutes a vital and necessary component of
visions of radical change in the direction of social justice and equality, one that cannot be
abandoned without direful political and ethical consequences (this is more or less Bloch’s
position, which Geogheghan acknowledges as a major influence in the book [8]); secondly,
that,  empirically speaking,  utopianism has had no stable conceptual  content,  but has
served as an imputation against antagonistic positions even while it has also implicated
itself in the anti-utopian rhetorical stance: thus Marx and Engels’s critical denunciation
of Utopian Socialism does not equal the absence of (self-consciously and unconsciously)
Utopian elements in their work; 2 the Utopian Socialists themselves were likely to see
themselves as “scientific” and denounce as “Utopian” the prejudicial beliefs of their own
societies; Kautsky’s attack against the Utopian precocity of Bolshevism does not exculpate
his own work from the charge of a Utopian investment in the efficacy of reformism, and
so on. The general formula Geoghegan traces until he gets to the discussion of Bloch and
his self-consciously Utopian epigones is in this sense that of “anti-utopian utopianism”
(58), of a denunciation of antagonistic political positions that fails to acknowledge its own
investments  in  a  set  of  competing  projections,  desideratums  and  ideals.  This
configuration  may  in  fact  be  traced  all  the  way  to  the  time  of  the  book’s  original
publication, since, as Geoghegan powerfully argues, “utopianism is also present in the so-
called ‘limited’ or ‘realist’ ideologies, including that of the “right-wing utopianism” that is
“Thatcherite conservatism”, with its idealization of a Victorian past and its wide-eyed
faith in the supreme rationality of the market (18).
6  But the tension between these two basic positions—the first of which posits a sort of
inherent ethical value in utopianism as a mode of thought, while the second interrogates
the existence of any kind of determinate or a priori content in it—creates a distinct and
far-reaching methodological problem: if “utopianism” has no outside—in the sense that it
may be imputed to virtually all positions in the ideological spectrum—then why does it
possess any substantive value as a principle? And further, if there is no position outside a
conscious or unconscious (or both) investment in utopianism, then how is one to prevent
Utopia from fully collapsing into ideology, as another version of ideology’s own lack of an
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outside? This is an important issue, for one of the fundamental definitions of the Utopian
is that it is a critique of ideology that remains itself ideological to the extent that it is not
conscious of the grounds of its critique3; but this seems to be precisely the problem with
Geoghegan’s own position, which seems to consist in a series of critiques conducted from
a position that disclaims a vested political ground, seeming rather to emerge out of a
purely  “corrective”  agenda,  one  that  ultimately  consists  in  curtailing  this  or  that
theoretical excess. 
7  The  difficulties  that  arise  out  of  this  comparative  lack  of  critical  reflexivity  are
instantiated, to take two examples, in the author’s claim that Gorz’s presentation of a
brief Utopia of a future society “can only be to the good” (170); or in his suggestion,
shortly after, that Marxism-Leninism has “proved to be the most unsatisfactory” (172)
strategy  for  harnessing  the  utopian tradition,  given  its  failure  to  offer  “principled
commitment”  to  “democratic  pluralism” (174).  Both of  these  positions  are  obviously
evaluative—producing a concrete vision of  utopia is  “good,” the Leninist  refusal  of  a
pluralist  politics  is  not—but an explicit  defense of  the grounds for  such judgment is
missing.  The  consequence  is  that  both  statements  obtain  a  naturalized,  and  hence
profoundly  ideological,  valence.  Geoghegan’s  new  preface  to  the  book  seems  to
accentuate, if anything, the original’s sense of irresoluteness regarding theoretical and
political positioning: “I am struck in re-reading the text how much I present myself as an
insider in the Marxist  tradition,  identifying myself  (though selectively)  with its  past,
defending it from ideological attack, and keen to refashion it for modern conditions…[The
book] is hostile to what it terms the ‘authoritarian utopianism’ of Marxism-Leninism, but
is keen to point to the elements of positive utopianism associated with the growth of the
Soviet Union” (7-8). What is striking here is precisely a sense of ambivalence toward the
position of critical enunciation (the author is struck, virtually in wonder, by his own self-
presentation as an “insider” of the Marxist tradition), one that is hardly resolved by the
proclamation of abiding faith in “positive utopianism” (for what, politically, is to decide
the  grounds  of  such  positivity?)  Throughout  the  book,  the  author  seems  at  once
genuinely unwilling to relinquish the hard core of the Marxist tradition, including some
of its most engaged and politically militant embodiments (Lenin, Luxemburg, Sorel) and
strongly attracted by the pluralist, liberal and largely post-Marxist language of the “new
social movements” of feminism, queer activism and new labor (strikingly, reference to
Laclau and Mouffe’s elaboration of a theoretical bridge between Gramscian hegemony
and the demands of a post-Marxist political strategy for the left is missing). 
8  That said, Geoghegan’s book remains a genuine treasure-trove for anyone interested in
the broader,  and still  very much relevant,  parameters of  the vexed relation between
utopianism  and  Marxism.  The  author  displays  a  wide-ranging  and  internationally
informed knowledge of the trajectories of Marxist debates around the question of Utopia.
One is particularly struck by the fresh light cast by his discussion of Kautsky, Bernstein,
Luxemburg, Plekhanov, Kuskova and Lenin in the chapter on the second International; of
Lafargue, Bebel, Morris, Reich, and Sorel in the chapter on reappropriations of mythical
and golden age legacies by the broader left; of idealizations of bureaucratic rationality in
the discourse of western apologists of Stalinism in chapter 5; and of the complex and
interesting intellectual trajectories of postwar Marxists like Bahro and Gorz. This is not
terrain  often  traversed,  especially  with  such  encyclopedic  erudition  and  effortless
synthetic capacity. Geoghegan’s prose and manner of presentation is thoroughly (and
refreshingly) unpretentious, and the chapter on Marx, Engels and the Utopian Socialists
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remains all but indispensable for any scholar interested in the complex, ambiguous and
ultimately irresolvable relation of Marxism to future-oriented thought. This is a book that
is  definitely  worth  reading  (or  re-reading),  particularly  now,  at  a time  when  an
identifiable renewal of left political thought is in sight—one for which the question of the
political “real” is no longer reducible to that of “political realism” and the urgent appeal
to  political  militancy  does  not  presuppose  the  prior  identification  of  a  historically
predestined and readily identifiable revolutionary subject.
Antonis Balasopoulos, University of Cyprus
9  
NOTES
1. Alain Badiou, “One Divides itself into Two”, in Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of Truth,
ed. Sebastian Badgen, Stathis Kouvelakis and Slavoj Žižek, Durham, Duke University
Press, 2007, 9.
2. On this question, also see Simon Tormey, “From Utopian Worlds to Utopian Spaces:
Reflections on the Contemporary Radical Imaginary and the Social Forum Process,” 
Ephemera 5.2 (2005), 396-397.
3. See Louis Marin, “Theses on Ideology and Utopia” in Utopics: Spatial Play, trans. Robert
A. Vollrath, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1984, 196: “Utopic criticism is
ideological insofar as utopia as discourse does not allow for the exposure of the
methodology that would legitimate it. It does not produce the theory of its production.”
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